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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
Property Tax  PT 
Octroi  OCT 
Total Tax Receipts  TTAX 
Municipal Properties  MPROP (fees) 
MRTP Act  MRTP 
Public Health  IPHLTH 
Water Supply  IWATER 
Drainage  IDRAIN 
Total Non Tax Receipts  NTAX 
Govt. Grants  GRANT 
Plan Grants  PGRANT 
Revenue Receipts  RRC 
Loans  LOAN 
Capital Receipts  CRC 
Suspense  SUS 
Opening Balance  OPBAL 
Total Receipts  TRC 




Sanitation, Drainage  XSANI 
Conservancy XCON 
Museum and Gardens  XMU 
Public Health  XPHLTH 
Fire Fighting  XFIRE 
Water supply  XWATER 
Street Lighting  XSTREET 
Public Works  XPWORK 
Revenue Expenditure  RX 
Capital Expenditure  CX 
Total Expenditure  TX 
Public Goods (Core) 
PUG1: This Includes sanitation 
(XSANI), conservancy (XCON), 
museums (XMU), fire (XFIRE), 
streets (XSTREET), public 
works (XPWORK).  
Public Goods (extended) 
PUG2: This includes in addition 
to PUG1, public health 
(XPHLTH), water (XWATER) 
and education (XEDU). 
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0. Preamble: City Regions as Economic Drivers: 
 
  The approach in this study is informed by two points of departure. The process of 
globalization has, in its wake, brought about many changes in the way in which we 
conceptualize and model economic processes (at least we should!). This is true especially 
in an emerging knowledge economy like India, pivoted by the surge in services’ sector. 
What this has meant is that the old nation states and their derivatives, the state level 
economies no longer completely capture the essence and hence are not the most useful 
primary economic entities to be considered when one sits down to theorize and design 
appropriate policy responses. Cities and towns are the primary drivers of modern 
economies and need to find a suitable place in our schema. Again, the city and town 
boundaries as defined for the purposes of administration may not be quite so useful and 
the regions surrounding them, forming a meaningful agglomeration, may be rather more 
useful as primary focus of any study. Whilst this sentiment is likely to evoke a positive 
response amongst most, the needed changes – not very evident – indeed are far from 
easy. One of the chief stumbling blocks – pons asinorum – is the unavailability of 
relevant data. One has cried hoarse about this major lacuna and argued for a data 
warehouse and indeed an urban observatory. The reconciliation of scattered (over place 
and time) data as are available presents a daunting task that will unnerve even the most 
lion hearted. Matters are not helped by the fact that the Municipal Councils report to 
Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) whereas the Municipal Corporations are 
supposed to report to Urban Development Ministry (UDM (II)). 
  The second point of departure is provided by the third tier of government as 
enunciated by the 74
th Constitutional Amendment (CA) promulgated some fifteen years 
ago. The 74
th CA was almost an afterthought to the 73
rd, supposedly giving teeth to the 
famous Lord Rippon dictum of ‘power to the people’. The local governments were 
expected to govern with arms length understanding and perform various crucial 
functions. However, as is well known, the transfer of functions was not matched with 
commensurate transfer of either the resources or sufficient legislative power (including 
that required to raise resources on their own). 
  In the current context, with all the efforts to transform Mumbai, the region – 
Urban Agglomeration (UA) – that immediately comes to mind is MMR (Mumbai 
Metropolitan Region). Why MMR is so crucial in more ways than one to the Economy of 
Maharashtra State will become quite evident from the brief sketch of the MMR region 
provided elsewhere in the study. Suffice it to say that it contributes overwhelmingly to 
the state and nation’s economy and has been a major growth story in recent times. The 
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be underlined. Indeed this provides substance to the argument that both the state and the 
central government should be investing very heavily so as to ensure a stream of attractive 
returns in the immediate future. We now turn to MMR. 
 
I. MMR: Some Basic Facts  
The Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) extends over an area of 4355 sq.km. 
and comprises 13  municipal councils, 7 municipal corporations and 982 villages. There 
are 40 planning authorities in the region that are responsible for the micro-level planning 
of the different areas. Within the MMR region the are 1273 sq. km of urban area of which 
Greater Mumbai covers 468 sq.km and the other corporations and councils cover 805 sq. 
km. Rural areas of MMR cover 2614 sq. km. Total population of MMR is 17.81 million. 
Of this Mumbai alone is home to 11.91 million. Thus, Mumbai which comprises a mere 
10.7% area of the MMR region provides shelter to 67% of the population of MMR. From 
a world-wide list of 13 Municipalities which have population above 7 million, Mumbai 
ranks 4
th and from among them has the highest  population density 
http://www.demographia.com/db-world-muni.htm
Economic activity of any country or region can be gauged from the growth and 
levels of income. An accurate estimate of the income level in MMR region however, is 
not directly available from the existing database. The Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics, Government of Maharashtra collects and compiles Net State Domestic Product 
(NSDP) figures. There are certain methodological problems regarding allocation of 
NSDP to individual districts or smaller areas. However, district-wise estimation of 
District Domestic Product (DDP) under some assumptions was made available by the 
Government of Maharashtra (GOM, 1984). Since the MMR boundaries do not coincide 
with the district boundaries, the existing data base necessitates that the total District 
Domestic Product (DDP) of Greater Mumbai, Thane and Raigad be treated as the income 
of MMR. Using the district level information, we find that the annual per capita income 
in real terms stood at Rs.44816 in 2004-05. The total income in the region accounts for 
almost 40% of the GSDP of Maharashtra. In fact Mumbai alone accounts for 27% of 
Maharashtra’s GSDP. 
To get some fix on the extent of over estimation due to the fact that we are using 
district level incomes instead of income of the local bodies we use the proximate measure 
of population distribution. The total population of the districts of Thane, Raigad and 
Mumbai Municpal Corporation is 22.25 lakhs. The population of ULBs that fall in the 
geographical territory of MMR is seen to be 79.57% of the combined population (urban + 
rural) of Mumbai, Thane and Raigad districts. Now rural incomes are by and large much 
lower than urban incomes. In MMR however the contiguity aspect means that this 
differential would be some what subdued. If we consider that these villages are 
predominantly in Raigad and Thane districts (with most of them in Raigad) then 
considering the average per capita incomes in those two districts and assuming that the 
populations are samples from the same general population, we solved a simple 
simultaneous equation system. This gave us the average per capita income for rural and 
urban population in these districts. By subtracting the incomes so attributable to the rural 
population we estimated the income for MMR. This turns out to be 88% of the total 
income gotten by adding the individual districts. Of course this is still a rough guess 
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and Statistics to work together for an exact estimation of MMR income. They would need 
to identify the codes of the villages in the source data that has been compiled to get the 
aggregate. For our part, we merely mention this up front and let it be! This is clearly an 
example of a situation arising because of the fact that our institutions and the data sets are 
not geared to responding in terms of newer emerging – economically relevant entities – 
categories such as regions.  
Administratively the urban local bodies (ULBs) are under the Urban Development 
Department (II) but many of their functions happen via quasi-government agencies. The 
Municipal councils are all under the Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) 
while Municipal Corporations are directly under Urban Development Department (UDD) 
some of the important state level quasi government agencies that function include: Under 
the Urban Development Department (I) we have Directorate of Town Planning, Mumbai 
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA), City and Industrial 
Development Corporation (CIDCO). Water supply and Sanitation work happens via 
Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran (MJP). The Maharashtra State Road Development 
Corporation (MSRDC) functions under the Public Works Department.  Maharashtra 
Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA), Regional Boards for Mumbai and 
Konkan and Mumbai Slum Improvement Board, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority 
(SRA) all function under the Housing Department. In addition to these state level 
agencies there are also central level agencies that play a development al and regulatory 
role. Important among them are: Airports Authority of India, National Highway 
Authority of India, Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation, Railway Boards. 
The large number of parastatal agencies listed out above clearly are a huge 
logistical challenge when it come to coordination and governance, but they are also a 
pointer to the fact that finances and activities of the ULBs form only a fraction of the 
activity and finances of the entire MMR region. To get a holistic picture one would have 
to understand the functioning of all these agencies and the finances that they bring to the 
MMR region.  While a detailed analysis of each of these parastatal agencies is beyond the 
scope of this study, the present study attempts to touch upon some of the important 
parastatal agencies. The focus of this paper is on the finances of the ULBs that were 
sought to be strengthened and empowered by the 74th Constitutional Amendment, which 
was supposed to have transformed India from a quasi-federal to a federal setup proper.  
 
II. ULB Finances of MMR Region: A Snapshot Picture  
For purpose of our study we have categorized the urban section of MMR region 
which we analyse into three sub-groups: The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 
(MCGM); the other Municipal Corporations (OMC) and the Municipal Councils (CO). In 
our study the MMR region as a whole is effectively a sum of MCGM, OMC and CO. As 
was mandated we have conducted our exercise with the ‘actuals’ rather than budgeted 
magnitudes. This has meant that we could not go beyond 2004-05. One more year could 
have been added – using a different sources – but reconciliation with earlier series would 
have been a major exercise and in our view nothing substantial would have been gained. 
On the receipts front we analyse the trend in tax and non-tax revenues. From 
among the tax revenues we focus on property tax and octroi. We also examine receipts in 
the form of grants, loans and borrowings (capital receipts). On the expenditure front it is 
  5important to look at the shares of revenue and capital expenditures and within revenue 
expenditures we identify those categories of expenditure that could be termed as ‘public 
goods’ where local government intervention is desirable. We have two definitions of 
public goods: PUG1 are the core public goods where government intervention is a must. 
It includes expenditure on Sanitation, Drainage, Conservancy, Museums, Fire, Street 
Lighting and Public Works. PUG2 includes those goods where private participation can 
be introduced but government intervention is still justifiable. This is the extended 
definition of public goods, which in addition to core services includes water, education 
and health. 
Relative significance of our three sub-groups viz, MCGM, OMCs and COs can be 
gauged from the share of each of these sub-groups in the receipts and expenditure of the 
MMR region. These shares for the year 2004-05 in real terms (figures have been deflated 
using District Domestic Product deflators) are tabulated in table 1 below: 
Table 1 
Share of MCGM, OMC and CO in Receipts/Expenditure of MMR in 2004-05 
(1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) 











Receipts       
Property Tax  81.8  15.09  3.11 
Octroi 78.2  21.59  0.19 
Other Tax (minor taxes like show tax etc.)  78.7  11.13  10.20 
Total Tax Receipts  79.6  18.79  1.58 
Municipal Properties (fees)  82.9  13.73  3.40 
MRTP Act  53.9  43.08  3.03 
Public Health  75.9  21.86  2.23 
Water Supply  76.4  22.34  1.22 
Drainage 91.7  8.09  0.19 
Total Non Tax Receipts 80.9  17.49  1.60 
Govt. Grants  11.1  53.23  35.64 
Plan Grants  17.1  57.80  25.08 
Other Income (minor sources of income 
primarily interest from invest.)  79.3 18.83  1.92 
Revenue Receipts  78.2 18.95  2.84 
Loans 33.6  57.95  8.43 
Capital Receipts  82.0 15.69  2.26 
Total Receipts  75.2 21.50  3.35 
Expenditure       
Revenue Expenditure  74.2  22.49  4.67 
Capital Expenditure  56.9  37.68  7.58 
Total Expenditure  72.9  23.46  5.12 
PUG1 (core)  77.9  18.48  5.11 
PUG2 (extended)  75.3  21.66  4.21 
 
 
It is no surprise that the lion’s share in the receipts and expenditure (75%) of 
MMR is claimed by MCGM.. Looking at specific taxes we find that MCGM contributes 
  681% of property taxes, 78% of Octroi and 78% of the other taxes like show tax, 
advertisement tax, tree planatation tax etc. which have been clubbed together under the 
head of ‘other taxes’. MCGM also contributes 80% of non-tax revenues.  
MCGMs share in MMR region of revenue and capital expenditures are 74% and 
57% respectively. MCGM spends 78% of the MMR’s income on core public goods 
(PUG1) and its share is 75% for PUG2. Thus the influence of MCGM on MMRs’ budget 
is overpowering - to the extent of 75%.  
The average share of OMCs in spending and receipts is seen to be about 20%. 
There is some variation in this category of OMCs. Individual contribution ranges from a 
maximum of 6.6% for Thane to 1.6% for Ulhasnagar. Table 2 below lists the shares in 
total receipts for each of the seven corporations in the MMR region.  
Table 2 
Share of Total Receipts of Corporations in MMR region in 2004-05 
(1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (%)                                                                           
Corporations   Share in Total Receipts 
Mumbai (MCGM)  72.88 
Thane 6.64 
Navi Mumbai  5.33 
Kalyan - Dombivali  4.66 
Ulhasnagar 1.62 
Bhiwandi-Nizampur 2.63 
Mira Bhayandar  2.58 
 
Clearly, MCGM with 72.8% share in MMR’s receipts stands out as distinct from 
the other municipal corporations in MMR region.  
The third sub-group of urban MMR is the municipal councils. The aggregate 
share of expenditures and receipts of councils (CO) in the MMR region, as seen from 
table 1, is 5%. A listing of the shares of the individual councils in the total receipts of 
MMR is provided in Table 3.  
Table 3 
Share of Total Receipts of Councils in MMR region in 2004-05 
(1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator)   (%)                                                              














Individual share of total revenue collections in the councils vary from a maximum of 
0.54% in Ambernath to a minimum of 0.05% in Karjat. The above reveals a picture along 
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grants, where there is a slight inversion – one would expect grants to the weakest to form 
the highest share – with the share of the OMCs being greater than Cos. 
We examine the dynamic picture – trends and key ratios - how they have evolved 
over the last five years and the signals that they send out. We look at the broad picture for 
the MMR region as a whole and for the three sub-groups that we have identified above 
(MCGM, OMC and CO).   
 
III.0. ULB Finances of MMR Region: The Dynamic Overview 
Table 4 below gives us a picture of the significance of the various revenue sources 
in MMR region and how their significance has undergone a change during the last five 
years.  
Table 4 
Composition of Receipts: MMR Region (%) 
                          
   2000-2001 2001-2002  2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 
PT/OWN   23.38  19.96  18.25  18.83  19.03 
OCT/OWN 38.34  37.21  40.76  40.62  40.78 
NTAX/TRC 27.90  30.36  29.00  27.09  26.13 
TTAX/TRC 56.88  52.33  54.56  52.69  50.92 
OWN/TRC 84.78  82.68  83.56  79.78  77.05 
GRANTS/TRC 1.23  1.29  1.06  1.17  1.41 
LOANS/TRC 5.79  6.30  1.43 1.06  1.20 
CRC/TRC 0.65  1.39  5.03  6.85  7.55 
 
  Own sources of revenue, both tax and non-tax together (OWN/TRC) constituted 
85% of total receipts in 2000/01. This share has reduced by 8 percentage points to reach 
77% in 2004/05. Looking at specific taxes, the share of Property Tax (PT/TRC) in own 
receipts shows a reduction of 4 percentage points while the share of Octroi (OCT/TRC) 
has in fact increased from 38% to 40%. The share of non-tax revenues had increased to 
reach 30% in 2001/02 but since then it has shown a steady decline. However, non-tax 
revenues by nature are not progressive and hence expected to show a declining share. The 
reduction in the share of property taxes is a cause for concern. We shall look at this tax in 
some detail later, but we must mention here that one would expect property tax to 
become a dominant source of local body revenues. That it is not so is a pointer that much 
needed rationalization is called for, especially in the context of booming real estate 
prices. Also the fact that a ‘bad’ tax like octroi is increasing in importance is worrying to 
say the least. The share of CRC in total receipts (CRC/TRC) has risen from a mere 0.65% 
in 2000/01 to 7.25% in 2004/05. This clearly points to the fact that own sources of 
revenue have proved to be inadequate to meet growing expenditure needs.  
  The growth rates and buoyancy for the various components of revenue have been 





Growth Rate and Buoyancy of Receipts of MMR Region (urban) 
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Growth Rate (%) 
(2000/01 to 2004/05) 
Buoyancy (%) 
(2000/01 to 2004/05) 
PT -0.06  0.07 
OCT 6.0  0.68 
TTAX 6.0 0.72 
MPROP (fees)  10.0  1.12 
MRTP 19.0 2.13 
IPHLTH 11.0  1.16 
IWATER 4.0  0.44 
IDRAIN -0.80  -0.04 
NTAX 5.0 0.53 
GRANT 9.0  1.12 
PGRANT 8.0  1.10 
RRC 6.0  0.74 
LOAN -39.0  -4.10 
CRC 70.0  7.54 
SUS 6.0  0.70 
OPBAL  27.0 3.19 
TRC 7.8  0.90 
 
  Revenue from non-tax sources (NTAX) has recorded a growth rate of 5% and a 
buoyancy of 0.53. Low growth rate and buoyancy are to be expected in case of non-tax 
revenues due to their intrinsic nature. However, the major taxes i.e. property tax and 
octroi have recorded a growth rate of -0.06% and 6% respectively over the last five year 
period. The buoyancy of both these taxes are under unity, with that of property taxes 
being as low as 0.07. Clearly, revenue collection from property tax is well below 
potential.  
  From among the external sources of revenue, loans have shown a negative growth 
rate, grants a growth rate of 9% and capital receipts (CRC) has shown a very high growth 
rate of 70%. Attention was drawn to this increase in borrowings even previously when 
discussing the revenue composition. Borrowings, if used for infrastructure and other 
capital investments is justifiable. However, if they are used for revenue expenditures it 
would soon lead to spiraling debt payments. A fair idea of where these borrowings are 
being directed will be obtained when we look at the expenditure side of the balance sheet.  
Two interesting, but worrying figures to note from the table 5 above are the 
growth rate of suspense accounts (SUS) and that of opening balance (OPBAL). Suspense 
accounts are ad hoc in nature and funds are deposited in this account till their specific 
heads are located. Best public finance practices require that there are processes in place 
that are efficient so that these funds are kept to the minimum. A growth rate of 6% for 
SUS shows that at the end of the financial year the ULBs have funds with them, which 
they are unable to identify the use of. This calls for a functional review of inter and intra 
departmental processes to instill some efficiency and accountability. Also, a growth rate 
of 27% of the opening balance – i.e. unspent funds which are carried over from the 
previous year - is a pointer to the poor absorptive capacity of the ULBs.  
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expenditure side where we examine the shares of revenue and capital expenditures. Table 
6 below lists these shares:  
Table 6 
Composition of Expenditure of MMR Region (%) 
   2000-2001  2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 
RX/TX 61.25 62.33 61.61 57.82  54.92 
CX/TX 31.23 22.43 17.40 18.36  19.27 
RX/RRC  71.70 73.88 71.83 71.19  67.90 
PUG1/TX  24.18 24.33 23.25 23.03  21.47 
PUG2/TX  50.28 50.01 48.56 47.85  44.04 
 
The share of revenue expenditure in total expenditures (RX/TX) was as high as 
61% in 2000/01. Its share continued to remain at this level till 2002/03. Since 2003/04 the 
share has seen a reduction (a welcome sign), but continues to remain as high as 55% in 
2004/05. The share of capital expenditure (CX/TX) has shown a sharp decline from 31% 
in 2000/01 to 19% in 2004/05 i.e. a decline of 12 percentage points. This is certainly 
worrying. The share of revenue expenditure in revenue receipts (RX/RRC) indicates the 
extent of revenue expenditure that is being funded from revenue receipts i.e. without 
recourse to borrowing. This ratio has declined from 71.7% in 2000/01 to 67.9% thus 
indicating that there has been a shift towards using borrowings to fund the revenue 
expenditure. This pointer is worrying – markets can and should be accessed for purposes 
of capital expenditures and not for spending on revenue expenditures. What further adds 
to our worry is that the share of spending on public goods both, core and extended (PUG1 
and PUG2), show a declining trend. Table 7 below reports the growth rate of various 
expenditure categories and their buoyancy:  
Table 7 
Growth Rate and Buoyancy of Expenditure of MMR Region (urban) 
(93-94 prices: DDP deflator) 
  
Growth Rate (%) 
(2000/01 to 2004/05) 
Elasticity (%) 
(2000/01 to 2004/05) 
XADMIN 3.7  0.39 
XEDU 7.0  0.81 
XSANI 8.0  1.00 
XCON 4.0  0.48 
XMU 2.0  0.25 
XPHLTH 0.3  0.05 
XFIRE 3.0  0.36 
XWATER 6.0  0.74 
XSTREET 0.9  0.16 
XPWORK 4.9  0.55 
RX 5.0 0.58 
CX -2.7 -0.16 
TX 7.8 0.90 
PUG1 5.1  0.59 
PUG2 4.9  0.57 
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expenditures (RX) showing a growth rate of 5% and capital expenditures -2.7%. A 
negative buoyancy of -0.16% shows that the spending on capital expenditures have in 
fact been axed with rising incomes. The elasticity of the two categories of public goods 
that we have defined (PUG1 and PUG2) show a buoyancy of only 0.6 thus pointing out 
that even within revenue expenditures, the spending on public goods has not kept pace 
with their rising incomes. To get some impression of the actual amounts that are being 
diverted to these functions we tabulate the expenditure in per capita real terms. The 
figures have been deflated using the DDP deflator (Table 8).  
Table 8 
Per Capita Expenditure of MMR Region (urban) 












XADMIN 169  175  188  176  203 
XEDU 152  146  172  198  189 
XSANI 119  109  123  134  166 
XCON 179  168  176  187  208 
XMU 16  16  15  17  17 
XPHLTH 183  173  174  177  183 
XFIRE 18  18  18  19  20 
XWATER 235  232  242  276  297 
XSTREET 45 42  39  43  46 
XPWORK 148  166  163  201  173 
XMISC 75  91  117  88  121 
RX 1340  1335  1427  1516  1623 
CX 686  491  422  503  590 
XSUS 146  201  284  401  633 
CBALANCE -6  94 184  188 81 
TX 2210  2163  2346  2641  2963 
PUG1 525  518  535  601  630 
PUG2 1096  1069  1122  1252  1299 
 
Table 8 shows that in real per capita terms the local governments in MMR region 
show total expenditure (TX) ranging from Rs.2000 to Rs.3000. TX has shown a rise of 
Rs. 750 per capita in the five year period under study. Revenue expenditures (RX) per 
capita have shown an increase of Rs. 283 and capital expenditures (CX) a reduction of 
almost Rs.100. 
Undoubtedly the reduction in per capita spending on capital expenditures in 
absolute terms is a matter of concern. However, while reading these numbers we need to 
bear in mind that ULBs are not the only route of capital expenditures in MMR. In fact 
much of the capital expenditures in MCGM in particular are routed via parastatal 
agencies of the state and the central government which were referred to earlier in the 
study. Of course, whilst major capital expenses could be funded by ‘others’ it is expected 
that small expenditures of ‘capital’ nature, especially with regards to PUG1 and PUG2 
should be borne by ULBs. This is clearly not happening and to the extent the hindrance 
comes from scarcity of revenues, efforts to raise revenues deserve serious attention and 
action. One general caveat needs to be entered though - these are per capita magnitudes 
and so a critique about their movement over time has to be with reference to some 
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involved that should not be lost sight of. 
  Having obtained a birds eye view of aggregate finances of the MMR region as a 
whole, we turn to the three sub-groups or components that we identified viz., Municipal 
Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), Other Municipal Corporations (OMC) and 
Municipal Councils (CO). 
 
III.I. Fiscal Scenario: MCGM  
Mumbai Municipal Corporation is the largest contributor to revenues of MMR 
region. In Table 1 above we saw that that MCGM alone constituted as much as 75% of 
the receipts and expenditure that was incurred in the MMR region. In this sub-section we 




Some key ratios pertaining to MCGM similar to those that were computed for 
MMR region in the previous section and the various revenue sources in real per capita 
terms are tabulated in Table 9 below: 
Table 9 
Composition of Receipts: Mumbai Municipal Corporation (MCGM) (%) 
  2000-2001  2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004  2004-2005 
PT/OWN 24.65  20.47  18.77  19.28  19.38 
OCT/OWN 35.32  34.14  38.94  39.30  39.97 
OWN/TRC 89.57  86.60  87.81  84.84  81.30 
NTAX/TRC 31.15  33.97  31.50  29.56  27.82 
TTAX/TRC 58.42  52.62  56.31  55.28  53.48 
CRC/TRC 0.51  1.50  5.97  7.05  8.14 
GRANTS/TRC 0.61 0.80  0.51 0.38  0.26 
LOANS/TRC 5.93  6.99  1.24  0.52  0.58 
Per Capita (1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) 
PT 638  479  476  527  569 
OCT 914  799  987  1074  1173 
OTHTAX 136  144  163  180  189 
TTAX 1687  1423  1626  1780  1931 
MPROP 175  201  219  220  255 
IPHLTH 14  16  17  21  18 
IWATER 399  398  403  418  421 
IDRAIN 299  291  256  273  283 
NTAX 900  918  909  952  1004 
GRANT 11  18  13  9  7 
PGRANT 6  4  1  3  3 
OTHINC 32  45  52  37  139 
RRC 2637  2408  2602  2781  3084 
LOAN 171  189  36  17  21 
CRC 15  40  172  227  294 
SUS 0  0  0  0  0 
OPBAL 0  4  34  146  157 
TRC 2889  2703  2887  3220  3611 
  12Table 9 shows that MCGMs dependence on Octroi, a source of revenue that is 
widely accepted to be problematic and a source of corruption and delays, continues. Its 
share has in fact increased. To repeat, this implies difficulty in removal of this tax, which 
by consensus is deemed to be a ‘bad’ one. The share of Octroi in own receipts of MCGM 
has risen from 35% in 2000/01 to 40% in 2004/05. In per capita terms it has risen by Rs. 
260 from Rs. 914 to Rs.1173. 
The share of own receipts of MCGM (i.e. tax and non-tax sources) in total 
receipts has shown considerable decline from 89% to 81%. Of the components of own 
revenues we are not surprised at the reduction in the share of non-tax revenue from 31% 
to 28% as these sources of revenue i.e. fees etc. are not progressive by nature and hence 
their share is not expected to show much of an increase. However, the reduction in the 
share of total tax revenues in total receipts (TTAX/TRC) from 58% in 2002/03 to 53% in 
2004/05 is disturbing. 
Yet another worrying feature that is noticed is that the share of capital receipts in 
total receipts (CRC/TRC) has grown from a mere 0.5% to 8%. In real per capita terms it 
has grown from a mere Rs.15 to Rs.294. As mentioned previously, accessing the capital 
markets has become a necessity to fund the large infrastructure projects. However, one 
must not lose sight of the fact that these funds do add to the debt liability and hence its 
usage must be closely monitored. The temptation to use some proportion of these 
borrowed funds for meeting the escalating revenue expenditures is very strong. The 
untapped potential in tax sources due to loopholes in the system and collection 
inefficiencies must not be lost sight of. One such tax where collections are well below 
potential in MCGM are property taxes and it is to some facts and figures pertaining to 
property tax that we now turn. 
 
Property Tax  
Property taxes are based on the Annual Rateable Value (ARV). A study by Karnik 
et. al, (2001) pointed out the benefit of moving over to the capital value based system. It 
is known that theoretically – under competitive conditions and flex markets – both capital 
and annual value bases are equivalent but differences do arise as each system has its own 
quirks and idiosyncrasies. The rental value system places considerable amount of 
discretionary powers in the hands of the assessing officers which results in a lack of 
transparency. Revenue collections have been adversely affected because of the rent 
control restrictions. Table 9 above shows that property taxes constituted only 25% of own 
source revenue of MCGM in 2000/01. Due to the well known problems of the Rent 
Control Act even this share has further declined to less than 20% in 2004-05.  
Table 10 below shows the growth rate in number of properties and in the rateable 
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Annual Growth Rate in the Annual Ratable Value (ARV) in City and Suburbs of Mumbai  
 








2002-03 0.21  12.27  2.66  41.42  5.76 
2003-04 0.33  9.13  6.00  4.10  6.73 
2004-05 0.23  10.85  -14.29  45.86  -6.15 
Average 0.25  10.75  -1.88  30.46  2.11 
Western Suburbs 
2002-03 10.48  13.43  6.49 6.10  10.46 
2003-04 4.08  9.44  20.59  -4.81  13.70 
2004-05 -8.16  12.35  8.07  20.22  10.63 
Average 2.13  11.74  11.72  7.17  11.59 
Eastern Suburbs 
2002-03 0.77  10.77  7.31  10.61  9.20 
2003-04 6.09  11.28  12.85  6.40  11.87 
2004-05 -3.77  15.31  9.52 3.41  12.46 
Average 1.03  12.45  9.89  6.81  11.18 
 
The annual rateable value is a combination of two factors: number of properties 
and the market rent. In the City, the rents are more or less fixed at very low levels and 
also not too many new properties are coming up there. This is reflected in the low rate of 
growth of properties (0.25%). The growth rate of rateable value for all properties in the 
city is fairly low at 2.11%. In contrast new properties in the suburbs are taxed at the 
currently prevailing "market" rents. Hence the rate of growth of rateable value is much 
higher. The growth rate of rateable value is 11% in the Western and Eastern suburbs. The 
growth rate of rateable value is seen to be higher in the eastern suburbs for residential 
properties and in the western suburbs for non-residential properties. These are clearly not 
in sync with the real estate prices that the rateable values are supposed to capture. The 
negative rates in some cases and the large number of exemptions are also problematic to 
explain. The only rationalization we can offer is to say that some modifications in the rent 
control act have affected some persons who have lobbied to get themselves be exempted. 
This tax we may say is another illustration of how a complicated tax is an avoidable way 
of doing things. 
In addition to the flaw in the system of property tax assessment, there is the added 
problem of collection inefficiency. The share of collection vis-à-vis the demand provides 
us with a proximate measure of efficiency. The trend pattern of this measure of efficiency 
(inefficiency) has been listed in Table 11A. 
Table 11A 








2001-02  240985.51 103289.26  48.36 
2002-03  253889.67 122784.88  48.36 
2003-04  297081.82 128198.23  43.15 
2004-05  334679.90 141460.55  42.27 
 
  14  Table 11A shows that the ratio of collections to total demand (i.e. the assessment) 
was as low as 48% in 2001-02. This has further declined to 42% in 2004-05. A back of 
the envelope calculation shows that even if collection efficiency were maintained at the 
2001/02 level of 48% collections would be Rs. 160646 lakhs i.e higher by Rs. 19186 lakhs 
i.e. 3% of total receipts of MCGM! 
  Thus the receipts side of the MCGM budget shows a declining trend in tax 
collections and greater focus on borrowings i.e. capital receipts. Just to provide some 
background as to where the property tax is emanating from (various user categories) we 
give below a table as an aside, without comment. 
Table 11B 
Distribution of Properties by Number, Carpet Area and Tax Paid According Use Categories 
(2001) 
User category   Number of 
Properties 
Total Carpet Area 
(in sq. mt.) 
Annual Property Tax 
(in Rs.) 
Residential (U2)  64247 (65.8%) 23970912 (69.2%) 1,32,92,55,434 (67.6%)
Industries/Factories (U3)   11738 (12.0%) 7046827 (20.3%) 36,52,06,796 (18.6%)
Shops (U4)  19410 (19.9%) 1650524 (4.8%) 8,57,69,698 (4.4%)
Offices (U5)  1704 (1.8%) 656422 (1.9%) 5,70,66,402 (2.9%)
Hotels (4 Star or lower) 
and Offices (U6) 
426 (0.4%) 880007 (2.5%) 8,05,09,518 (4.1%)
Hotels (5 star) (U7)  68 (0.1%) 435204 (1.3%) 4,72,64,180 (2.4%)
Total  97593 (100.0%)  34639896 (100%)  1,96,50,72,028 (100%) 
Source: Karnik et. al. (2001): Rationalisation of Property Tax in Mumbai Municipal Corporation”. Final 
Report submitted to the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 
 
As pointed out previously, judicious use of borrowings is essential. A scrutiny of the 
expenditure side of the MCGM budget would enable us to judge how prudently the 
government has utilized its resources. The broad share of revenue and capital 
expenditures in total expenditures are tabulated in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Composition of Expenditure: Mumbai Municipal Corporation (MCGM) (%) 
  2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003  2003-2004  2004-2005 
RX/TX 63.91  64.83  65.07  60.14  55.75 
KX/TX 32.01  21.36  14.80  14.59  15.54 
RX/RRC 57.60  63.33  64.04  61.63  58.01 
XADMIN/RX 12.29  13.02  13.01 11.09  12.32 
PUG1/TX 25.87  25.95  25.31  24.60  22.72 
PUG2/TX 53.17  52.44  51.78  50.27  45.30 
 
With all the qualifications, the trends in all the cases are clearly in the wrong 
direction and call for a reversal, if better quality and magnitude of civic services are to be 
provided to the citizens. Table 12 shows that the share of revenue expenditures in total 
expenditures (RX/TX) rose till 2002-03 when it crossed the 65%. Since 2003-04 a 
significant reduction of 5 percentage points every year has been noticed in the last two 
  15years. This is certainly a move in the right direction. However, the share of revenue 
expenditure in revenue receipts (RX/RRC) shows a declining trend, thus indicating that 
less of revenue expenditures is being funded from revenue receipts. In other words more 
of it is being funded from borrowings or capital receipts. This is a worrying statistic. 
Further, with the share of revenue expenditures declining one would have 
expected capital expenditures to show a rising trend. This, however, is not to be seen. In 
fact the share of capital expenditures in 2004/05 at 15.5% is less than half of its share in 
2000/01 (32%).  
What is even more disconcerting is the share of suspense accounts in total 
expenditures. As was mentioned previously, these suspense accounts refer to funds which 
have been kept – in an ad-hoc manner – under this account due to uncertainty about 
where it is to be directed or expenditures which are under process. In 2004/05 as much as 
25% of the total expenditure was recorded as being under suspense accounts. Clearly, 
such ad hocism reflects poorly on the efficiency of the administrative processes. There is 
a further problem that in presence of such a large amount in suspense account, our 
comments on the ‘other’ ratios and trends may be incorrect to some extent.  
  Having obtained the broad picture we took a closer look at the functional 
categories of expenditure. The share of each of these constituents in total expenditure 
have been tabulated in Table 13 below.  
Table 13 












XADMIN 7.86  8.44  8.46  6.67  6.87 
XEDU 8.40  8.05  8.97  8.97  7.17 
XSANI 6.79  6.28  6.76  6.55  7.29 
XCON 8.34  7.73  7.46  6.95  6.62 
XMU 0.74  0.75  0.70  0.62  0.52 
XPHLTH 10.25  9.74  9.02  8.19  7.32 
XFIRE 0.88  0.91  0.85  0.78  0.70 
XWATER 8.65  8.70  8.47  8.51  8.09 
XSTREET 1.49  1.48  1.28  1.33  1.30 
XPWORK 7.62  8.79  8.26  8.37  6.29 
PUG1/TX 25.87  25.95  25.31  24.60  22.72 
PUG2/TX 53.17  52.44  51.78  50.27  45.30 
 
  As stated previously the various expenditure heads have been grouped together as 
core public goods and services (PUG1) and the extended version (PUG2). We find that 
the share of core services (PUG1/TX) has remained more or less stable till 2002-03. In 
2003-04 there was a one percentage point cut and in 2004-05 there has been a two 
percentage point reduction.  
  When we consider the share of the extended definition of public goods 
(PUG2/TX) i.e. including education, health and water in addition to the core services, we 
find that its share has consistently reduced by one percentage point every year till 
2003/04. In the last year i.e. 2004-05 there has been the sharpest dip with its share 
reducing by 5 percentage points. The expenditure on various functional categories in per 
capita (real) terms is tabulated in Table 14 below:  
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Per Capita Real Expenditures: MCGM 












XADMIN 187 199 217 190 220 
XEDU  200 189 230 256 230 
XSANI  161 148 173 187 234 
XCON  198 182 191 198 212 
XMU  18 18 18 18 17 
XPHLTH  244 229 231 233 235 
XFIRE  21 21 22 22 23 
XWATER 206 205 217 242 260 
XSTREET  35 35 33 38 42 
XPWORK 181 207 212 239 202 
XMISC  68  93 124 91 115 
RX  1519 1525 1666 1714 1789 
CX  761 503 379 416 499 
XSUS  149 227 326 508 834 
CBALANCE -118  36  147  163  32 
TX  2376 2352 2561 2849 3209 
PUG1  615 610 648 701 729 
PUG2  1264 1234 1326 1432 1454 
 
A couple of interesting points that the above table makes is that  (1) expenditure 
under suspense accounts i.e. funds that have been kept ad hoc have increased from 
Rs.149 in 2000/01 in per capita real terms to Rs. 834 in 2004/05 i.e. a 5 fold increase (2) 
expenditure on health (XPHLTH) has reduced in per capita real terms from Rs. 244 in 
2000/01 to Rs. 235 in 2004/05 (3) per capita expenditure in real terms on capital 
expenditure shows a reduction in absolute terms from Rs. 761 in 2000/01 to Rs. 499 in 
2004/05. As an aside, we may mention here that whereas we have said enough about (1) 
and (3) elsewhere, as far as (2) goes, we believe, that there is a greater need to reorganize 
the health care system – along the lines of NHS in UK – rather than merely increase the 
expenditure on this count. 
Given that MCGM constitutes as much as 75%-80% of MMRs receipts and 
expenditures, it was to be expected that receipts and expenditure pattern of MMR is 
replicated when we analyse that of MCGM. It would, however, be interesting to note the 
difference, if any, in the expenditure and receipts pattern of the other municipal 
corporations (OMC) and municipal councils (COs) to which we now turn.  
 
III.2 Other Municipal Corporations (OMCs)        
  Municipal Corporations other than MCGM have been clubbed together as group - 
Other Municipal Corporations (OMCs). The share of various components of receipts for 
OMCs as has been computed for MCGM, have been tabulated in Table 15. It would be 
interesting to see if there is any difference in composition vis-à-vis the MCGM. 
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Composition of Receipts: Other Municipal Corporation (OMC) (%) 
  2000-2001 2001-2002  2002-2003  2003-2004  2004-2005 
PT/OWN REC.  14.30  15.61  13.79  15.07  15.60 
OCT/OWN REC  60.54  58.27  54.45  51.55  48.16 
OWN REC./TRC  67.80  70.41  70.64  64.43  65.11 
NTAX/TRC 14.93  16.28  20.43  19.41  21.01 
TTAX/TRC 52.88  54.13  50.20  45.01  44.10 
CRC/TRC 0.85  0.97  1.10  6.25  5.44 
GRANTS/TRC 2.75 1.88  2.70  2.93 4.05 
LOANS/TRC 5.40  3.96  2.49 3.05  3.52 
Per Capita (1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (in Rs.) 
PT 193  206  196  226  263 
OCT 819  768  772  772  812 
OTHTAX 43  40  40  49  67 
TTAX 1055  1013  1008  1047  1143 
MPROP 53  54  86  93  106 
IPHLTH 7  7  9  11  13 
IWATER 176  179  220  244  309 
IDRAIN 39  40  46  53  63 
NTAX 298  305  410  451  544 
GRANT 47  24  39  52  83 
PGRANT 7  12  15  16  21 
OTHINC 24  26  61  77  83 
RRC 1432  1379  1533  1643  1874 
LOAN 108  74  50  71  91 
CRC 17  18  22  145  141 
SUS 216  187  213  235  278 
OPBAL 223  214  190  230  206 
TRC 1995  1872  2007  2325  2591 
 
  The share of property tax in own receipts has shown an increase of one percentage 
point in the last two years. The share of Octroi on the other hand has reduced 
significantly from over 60% in 2000/01 to 48% in 2004/05. This pattern is in contrast to 
that of MCGM whose share of property tax in own receipts has declined and that of 
octroi has increased. However the ‘largeness’ of MCGM means that this trend is simply 
overpowered by when it comes to the overall effect in MMR. 
  Conforming to pattern observed for the MMR region and MCGM we find that the 
share of tax revenues in total receipts show a declining trend. However, in contrast to 
MCGM, finances of OMCs show an increasing trend in the share of non-tax receipts. For 
OMCs, the share of own tax revenues in total receipts has shown a fall of 6 percentage 
points in 2003/04. In 2004/05 it has been able to regain its share by only one percentage 
point. A common feature between the revenue composition of MCGM and OMC that 
comes across very noticeably is the significant rise in the share of capital receipts. The 
share of capital receipts (CRC/TRC) for OMCs has risen significantly from a mere 0.85% 
in 2000/01 to 5.44% in 2004/05.  
  Having obtained a fair idea of the receipts, we now turn to the expenditure side of 
the budget for OMCs.  
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RX/TX  52.58 53.79 49.88 51.04 52.50 
KX/TX  29.33 27.73 27.91 31.64 31.95 
RX/RRC  73.28 73.01 65.33 72.22 72.56 
XADMIN/RX  13.01 13.01 13.49 13.25 12.97 
PUG1/TX  17.79 17.73 15.20 17.52 16.75 
PUG2/TX  40.95 41.96 37.81 41.09 40.45 
  
  Even a cursory look at Table 16 above suggests that OMCs as a group have 
maintained a fairly stable composition of their expenditures. In contrast to MCGM, which 
showed a sharp cut in the share of capital expenditure, the share of capital expenditures 
for OMC has in fact shown a small improvement of two percentage points. In case of 
core public goods, the share of total expenditure OMCs record a much smaller cut in the 
share of PUG1. In case of PUG2 the share has in fact been maintained by OMCs.  
  A clearer and a more complete picture necessitates that we take a look at the 
levels of expenditure on various functional categories. Table 17 below looks at the 
expenditures on various functional categories in real per capita terms.  
Table 17 
Per Capita Real Expenditures in 2004-05: OMCs  
(1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (in Rs.) 
              2000-2001  2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 
XADMIN  137 131 135 157 176 
XEDU  63 66 61 90  117 
XSANI  37 34 22 27 30 
XCON  145 141 148 169 204 
XMU  14 12 10 16 18 
XPHLTH  65 63 62 70 84 
XFIRE  11 11 12 14 16 
XWATER  335 324 331 389 414 
XSTREET  66 59 52 53 54 
XPWORK 81  75  61  129  112 
XMISC.  96  90 107 74 136 
RX  1049 1007 1001 1187 1360 
CX  585 519 560 736 828 
XSUS  136 153 206 187 204 
CBALANCE  225 193 240 216 199 
TX  1995 1872 2007 2325 2591 
PUG1  355 332 305 407 434 
PUG2  817 786 759 955  1048 
  
Table 17 shows that per capita real expenditure on administration has risen by Rs. 39. 
While this may not be a very sharp hike but it certainly stands in contrast to the reduction 
on sanitation which shows a reduction in the already low level of expenditure from Rs.37 
in 2000/01 to Rs.30 in 2004/05. The expenditure on streets too has shown a reduction 
from Rs.66 per capita to Rs.54 during the five year period. 
  19   The expenditure categories on which there has been a significant hike include 
education (XEDU), conservancy (XCON), water (XWATER) and public work 
(XPWORK). Per capita expenditure on public health (XPHLTH) has increased from Rs. 
65 in 2000/01 to Rs.84 in 2004/05. However, the amount which is a mere 3% of the total 
expenditure certainly requires to be hiked further.  
The broad categories of revenue expenditure shows a hike in per capita terms of 
Rs.311 and that of capital expenditures a hike of Rs.243. Prima facie these statistics are 
certainly better than that of MCGM, which has registered a decline in absolute terms. 
However, as mentioned previously, capital expenditure in MCGM happens via many 
external agencies/programs like MUTP, MHADA, SRA, MMRDA etc.  
During the five year period under consideration the other municipal corporations 
(OMCs) on the receipts side show a lower share of octroi and no significant hike in 
property taxes leading to a fall in the share of total tax revenues in total receipts. While 
the share of non-tax revenues and grants has increased, these revenue sources have 
proved to be inadequate for OMCs for meeting the growing expenditure demands leading 
to a hike in the share of capital receipts. On the expenditure side, the share of core public 
services in total expenditures has shown a marginal reduction where sanitation and streets 
are the two categories that have suffered most. The share of the extended definition of 
public goods (PUG2) has been maintained essentially due to increase in expenditure on 
education and water. Expenditure on public health services has shown some increase but 
it continues to be at a very low level.   
Finally, we analyze the budget of Municipal Councils (COs) within the MMR 
region along similar lines as was attempted for MCGM and Other Municipal 
Corporations (OMC). 
 
III. 3 Municipal Councils (CO)       
  Municipal councils form the smallest administrative unit within the MMR region. 
Financially they are more dependent on the state government than the municipal 
corporations. Octroi which forms an important source of revenue for local bodies has 
been banned for municipal councils who receive Octroi grants in lieu of this tax from the 
state government. Along the lines of our analysis above for municipal corporations we 
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PT/OWN  59.24 58.11 57.56 55.29 48.88 
OCT  grants/OWN  132.60 129.66 125.69 137.68  86.35 
OWN/TRC  24.44 24.07 23.41 21.74 27.54 
NTAX/TRC  8.64 8.72 8.15 8.08  12.28 
TTAX/TRC  15.81 15.36 15.26 13.66 15.26 
CRC/TRC  4.22 0.78 1.79 4.92 4.98 
GRANTS/TRC  11.65 12.70  7.49  11.69 16.15 
LOANS/TRC  3.98 0.12 0.43 3.16 3.25 
Per Capita (1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (in Rs.) 
PT  186 185 193 203 248 
OTHTAX  17 18 26 28 33 
TTAX  203 203 219 231 281 
OCT  grants  417 412 423 507 439 
MPROP  (fees)  31 36 37 49  120 
IPHLTH  3 4 4 4 6 
IWATER  56 52 58 66 77 
IDRAIN  5 6 5 2 7 
NTAX  111 115 117 137 228 
GRANT  137 144  95  172 256 
PGRANT  13 24 13 26 43 
OTHINC  28 32 45 48 38 
RRC  910 930 912  1120  1285 
LOAN  52 2  6 54  61 
CRC  55 10 26 83 93 
SUS  142 172 200 158 132 
OPBAL  181 209 299 331 336 
TRC  1288 1321 1436 1693 1846 
 
  Property taxes comprise almost 50% of the own source revenue for COs. Its share 
has reduced by almost 10 percentage points in the five years. This clearly shows that the 
system is of property taxes is plagued with problems and needs an overhaul. Although in 
absolute real per capita terms there has been an increase of Rs 60 in the five year period 
(Table 18).   
  The share of octroi grants in own receipts has reduced from 132% of own receipts 
to 86%. In real per capita terms Octroi grants have shown a sudden hike in 2003/04 but 
has fallen back to its previous level in 2004/05. Since these are in-lieu grants, the 
responsibility of this drop has to be squarely blamed on the State government, which 
must compensate the councils fully. Of course, given the fiscal stress that the state 
government itself is facing, it would appear that, unless made mandatory, the state 
government will continue to cut corners and try to pass on as little as possible. 
  The share of non-tax revenue in total receipts has risen from 8% to 12%. This has 
occurred primarily on account of the increase in fees from municipal properties 
  21(MPROP) which in real per capita terms has risen from Rs.31 in 2000/01 to Rs.120 in 
2004/05.  
  Having looked at the receipts side of the budget of Councils (CO) we take a look 
at the expenditure side.   
Table 19 
Expenditure: Municipal Councils (CO) 
  2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 
RX/TX  47.79 50.05 44.09 44.31 49.97 
KX/TX  22.81 16.91 19.75 25.93 29.48 
RX/RRC  67.59 71.12 69.47 66.94 71.86 
XADMIN/RX  19.34 16.29 16.57 14.21 13.71 
PUG1/TX  21.83 23.13 19.48 19.80 21.23 
PUG2/TX  34.76 36.15 31.13 31.93 36.05 
 
The share of revenue expenditure in total expenditure has risen from 47.7% to 
49.9% during the five years.  The share of capital expenditure has increased more than 
that of revenue expenditure (from 22.8% to 29.4%).  The ratio RX/RRC points out that 
almost 71% of the revenue expenditure is funded from revenue receipts while 30% of it is 
funded from borrowings. This proportion is similar to that of the other corporations and 
that of MCGM. A clearer picture would emerge when we look at the levels in per capita 
(real) terms.  
Table 20 
Per Capita Expenditures: Councils (CO) 
(1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (in Rs.) 
  2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 
XADMIN  119 108 105 107 127 
XEDU  19 15 15 25 43 
XSANI  11 8 13  14  17 
XCON  117 123 126 144 167 
XMU  7  8  10 12 17 
XPHLTH  27 28 27 30 40 
XFIRE  10 11 10 11 11 
XWATER  121 130 126 151 191 
XSTREET  52 48 46 60 62 
XPWORK  83 108 77  94 118 
XMISC  49 76 81  103  131 
RX  616 663 634 750 924 
CX  294 223 283 439 541 
XSUS  153 120 169 152 279 
CBALANCE  226 316 350 352 101 
TX  1288 1321 1436 1693 1846 
PUG1  281 306 280 335 392 
PUG2  448 478 448 541 667 
 
The expenditure in real per capita terms has increased for all categories. However, 
the amounts are extremely small. The per capita expenditure on education has increased 
to reach only Rs.43 and Rs.40 on health. The entire expenditure on core public goods 
(PUG1) is Rs. 392 and Rs. 667 for the broader definition of public goods (PUG2). The 
  22expenditure on PUG2 is less than 50% of the expenditure incurred by MCGM in real per 
capita terms and 60% of the expenditure by OMCs   
Having analysed the pattern of receipts and expenditure over the five year period 
we finally examine a comparative static picture of the MCGM, OMC and Councils for 
the last year of our study on both the receipts and expenditure side of the budget. 
Table 21 












PT/OWN 19.38  15.60  48.88 
OCT/OWN 39.97  48.16  86.35 
OWN./TRC 81.30  65.11  27.54 
NTAX/TRC 27.82  21.01  12.28 
TTAX/TRC 53.48  44.10  15.26 
CRC/TRC 8.14  5.44  4.98 
GRANTS/TRC 0.26  4.05 16.15 
LOANS/TRC 0.58  3.52  3.25 
 
Per Capita (1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (in Rs.) 
PT 569  263  248 
OCT 1173  812  33 
OTHTAX  189 67 281 
TTAX 1931  1143  439 
MPROP 255  106  120 
IPHLTH 18  13  6 
IWATER 421  309  77 
IDRAIN 283  63  7 
NTAX 1004  544  228 
GRANT 7  83  256 
PGRANT 3  21  43 
OTHINC 139  83  38 
RRC 3084  1874  1285 
LOAN 21  91  61 
CRC 294  141  93 
SUS 0  278  132 
OPBAL 157  206  336 
TRC 3611  2591  1846 
 
The own source revenue of municipal councils is only 27% of their total receipts. 
Hence the large share of property tax and in own source revenue octroi (PT/OWN and 
OCT/OWN) must not be interpreted as better performance on the part of the councils. 
The high ratio is on account of the denominator i.e. own source revenue being small. Tax 
and Non-tax revenue together constitute own source revenue. In real per capita terms 
councils receive Rs.439 as total tax revenue vis-à-vis Rs.1931 collected by MCGM. As 
non-tax revenue, councils collect Rs.228 vis-à-vis Rs.1004 collected by MCGM.  
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of their total receipts by way of grants while MCGM receives a mere 0.26% and OMCs 
receive 4%. This is a financing pattern that is expected, and as it should be, since 
municipal corporations in general, and MCGM in particular, have many outside sources 
of funding while municipal councils are largely dependent on the state and central level 
of government. 
Having analysed the difference in the three groups of local bodies we turn our 
attention to the expenditure side of the budget. 
Table 22 







OMC  CO 
 
RX/TX 55.75  52.50  49.97 
KX/TX 15.54  31.95  29.48 
RX/RRC 58.01  72.56  71.86 
XADMIN/RX 12.32  12.97  13.71 
PUG1/TX 22.72  16.75  21.23 
PUG2/TX 45.30  40.45  36.05 
Per Capita (1993/94 prices: DDP Deflator) (in Rs) 
XADMIN 220  176  127 
XEDU 230  117  43 
XSANI 234  30  17 
XCON 212  204  167 
XMU 17  18  17 
XPHLTH 235  84  40 
XFIRE 23  16  11 
XWATER 260  414  191 
XSTREET 42 54  62 
XPWORK 202  112  118 
XMISC 115  136  131 
RX 1789  1360  924 
CX 499  828  541 
XSUS 834  204  279 
CBALANCE 32  199 101 
TX 3209  2591  1846 
PUG1 729  434  392 
PUG2 1454  1048  667 
 
 
  We find that the share of revenue expenditure in total expenditure (RX/TX) for 
municipal councils is 50%. This is not too far away from the shares of MCGM and 
OMCs (55% and 52% respectively). The share of capital expenditure in total expenditure 
(CX/TX) for municipal councils is 30%. This is close to the proportion spent by the 
OMCs (32%) but almost double the share of MCGM which spends only 15%. In real per 
capita terms too we find that capital expenditure is Rs.541 for councils and Rs.499 in 
MCGM.  
  24  As regards core public goods we find that the proportion spent by COs exceeds 
that of OMCs and is only one percentage point behind MCGM. If the definition of public 
goods is extended i.e. PUG2, then the share of spending on this category by councils falls 
significantly short of the share of MCGM and OMC. In real per capita terms the spending 
by councils on education is 1/5
th that of MCGM and 1/3
rd of OMC. In case of public 
health, the real per capita spending is 1/5
th of spending by MCGM and half of that spent 
by OMCs. We wish to stress that the type of work undertaken as well as the incremental 
nature of these works not to speak about the benchmarks for what is expected to be 
delivered and hence the ‘optimal’ levels will have to be considered for a fuller critique of 
what is happening. This will involve case by case, micro field study and is clearly beyond 
the scope of our paper which seeks to provide a rather more macro perspective. 
 
IV. Investment (Borrowing) Capacity of ULBs 
The size of the local government is of the order of approximately 6-7% of the 
local economy in case of MMR. This naturally delimits the availability and capability of 
ULBs to make capital investments of any significant magnitude. However there are a host 
of parastatals that are in operation in the region that do undertake major investment 
projects and then hand over the assets for purposes of maintenance to the ULBs. Thus, 
although these numbers do not appear currently on the books of the ULBs, in the near 
future they have the potential (like the off-budget items) will cause budgetary stress and 
the ULBs need to prepared for this. The plethora of such parastatals do bring in their 
wake a host of governance hindrances and conundrums, but these need not detain us here.  
The parastatals of which MMRDA, MSRDC and MJP are the main ones have on 
going projects worth 65,000 crores rupees in the region (around 10,000 crores on roads 
and rest on others). These are large projects with MUTP being the kingpin. These 
projects are part financed by international agencies, central and state governments and the 
public. The assets that will be created under these projects will be reflected in the budgets 
later on when they are taken over for maintenance by the ULBs. 
Apart from the public domain, clearly the investment is happening in the private 
sector (where large growth is taking place). Different estimates, reflecting partial reality 
are available but it is a matter of some concern (embarrassment) that one cannot find 
available a figure that could work as a bench mark for total investment happening in the 
region. Clearly such an estimate is important but equally clearly, it is a matter for an 
entirely different (full-fledged) study. Let us now turn to estimating the borrowing 
capacity of the ULBs. For, they will be called upon to make large investment as a part of 
the overall growth strategy planned for the MMR region.  
Given that the ULBs are bestowed with limited resource raising powers and 
overburdened with expenditure responsibilities, market borrowings have become a 
necessity. Borrowings if channelized in the right direction and its usage monitored would 
provide the necessary impetus for the growing need for infrastructure investments.    
We calculated the borrowing capacity of ULBs as the annuity or net present value 
(NPV) of 50% of the latest Revenue Balance (Revenue receipts - Revenue expenditures), 
which is presumed to be repaid over 15 years at an assumed interest rate of 12 percent.  
This is a fairly standard methodology that we had used whilst doing a World Bank 
consultancy at an earlier time. These NPVs for the various ULBs in MMR have been 
tabulated in Table 23 below: 
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Borrowing Capacity of Urban Local Bodies (2004-05) 
                                                                                                                   (in Lakhs) 
            
ULB District  Class  RX  RRC 
Revenue 
Surplus 
(RRC-RX)  NPV 
                    
Mumbai (MCGM)  Mumbai  E  370799 555844  185045  630158 
Thane Thane  E  30915 40430  9515  32403 
Navi Mumbai  Thane  E  16317 25447  9130  31092 
Kalyan - Dombivali  Thane  E  16876 20671  3795  12924 
Ulhasnagar Thane  E  9807 11074  1267  4315 
Bhiwandi-Nizampur Thane  E  9546 15500  5954  20276 
Mira Bhayandar  Thane  E  7837 12700  4863  16561 
Ambernath Thane  A  2238 3276  1038  3535 
Virar Thane  A  1365 1798  433  1475 
Nalasopara Thane  A  1205 1559  354  1206 
Navgarh - Manikpur  Thane  A  1712 2022  310  1056 
Panvel Raigad  A  1973 2879  906  3085 
Kulgaon-Badlapur Thane  B  753 2514  1761  5997 
Vasai Thane  B  614 675  61  208 
Khopoli Raigad  B  1386 1573  187  637 
Pen Raigad  C  360 449  89  303 
Uran Raigad  C  599 637  38  129 
Alibagh Raigad  C  818 635  -183  -623 
Matheran Raigad  C  209 416  207  705 
Karjat Raigad  C  186 240  54  184 
                    
MMR Region        475515  700339  224824  765623 
 Note: Calculated as the annuity or net present value of 50 percent the latest Revenue A/C 
Balance (Revenue receipts - Revenue expenditures), presumed to repay debt over 15 years, at 
an assumed interest rate of 12 percent 
 
 
  Table 23 tells us that urban MMR as a whole has a borrowing capacity of 
Rs.765623 lakhs. Of this as much a 82% is the borrowing capacity of MCGM alone. 
From among the OMCs, Thane municipal corporation has the highest capacity to borrow. 
Among the councils Alibagh is the only council which has a negative NPV. It is seen 
from the above that the ULBs in MMR have an overall capacity to borrow about 7,656 
crore rupees. This needs to be juxtaposed with the current capital expenditure that the 
ULBs are incurring which is pathetically low at Rs. 1668 crore rupees. The borrowings 
(capital receipts) are currently at Rs. 717 crores. These numbers perhaps needs to be 
compared to the estimated investment of Rs. 65,000 crore rupees through the parastatals 
that is happening in the region. If one adds the huge private investment that is happening 
in the region, the starkly small fraction of investment that is taking place through the 
ULBs is quite apparent. Thus, there is a huge borrowing capacity available with the 
ULBs that can be put to good use, provided that good bankable infrastructure projects 
are formulated. This augers well, for the overall investment strategy in the region that 
  26will call upon the ULBs to jointly invest some amount in order to provide the 
infrastructure for basic amenities that would be increasing required in the context of an 
ambitious growth scenario. Thus, rationalization of user charges along with improvement 
of collection efficiency and a viable program for borrowing would seem to impart 
feasibility to the overall growth strategy in the region, at least as far as the economic 
aspect of ULBs is concerned. Perhaps equally important from the point of view of 
dynamic feasibility is the intrinsic capacity building both from the human and system 
point of view. This crucial aspect may be correctly seen as a governance related issue to 
which we now turn.  
 
V. Capacity Building: A Crucial Link 
  To recap, MMR is extremely crucial for the Economy of Maharashtra State and 
indeed that of India. It contributes overwhelmingly to the state and nation’s economy and 
has been a major growth story in recent times. The advantages in terms of revenues to the 
exchequer, of both the state and the nation need to be underlined (these have been amply 
stressed in the internal papers circulated by Prof. Remy Prudholmme and need not be 
gone into here). Indeed this provides the basis for a strategy of heavy investments at the 
national and metropolitan level ensuring attractive returns in the immediate future. 
  However, quantum of finance and financing strategies apart, there are some 
crucial issues of systemic and procedural nature as also capcity building of human agents 
that are embedded in the delivery agencies assume critical importance and can be ignored 
only at peril to the entire scheme/project. Some of the tasks transferred under the twelfth 
schedule involve strategic tasks to be carried out by the ULBs.  These involve integrated 
development planning, promoting economic growth and employment. This apart, it 
involves inculcating best practices in governance so as to impart transparency, 
accountability and efficiency to the processes so as to improve mechanisms and quality 
of service delivery. Finally, it also involves capacity building for enhanced revenue 
generation and process reengineering in both administrative and financial sections. 
Clearly then, for this to become a reality, HRD in ULBs must provide for structures and 
systems that will enable ULBs to address these strategic tasks and thus to advance 
organizational effectiveness. Let us dwell on the HR tasks (that are not recognized leave 
alone undertaken) that confront the ULBs in some detail. The observations are based on 
informal discussions and observations with the relevant stakeholders and officers. 
  The ultimate clients in our set up are the citizens. The way persons are hired, their 
qualifications and the filtering and selection process is non-descript and without any 
explicit or implicit thought to the job and performance expectations. The task orientation 
of the persons working within the ULBs is the first essential requirement. There are two 
caveats that need to be entered, one, that this recognition and focus can come about if it is 
ingrained in the workers in the ULBs upfront and right at the beginning when they are 
hired. Second the present situation of ULBs is such that the ULBs have extremely limited 
autonomy, if any, in their functioning. This implies that the state level institutions must 
be brought within the ambit of our considerations especially in areas where they exert 
major influence, if the interventions are to be meaningful. There is also a need to evolve 
institutional mechanisms that would allow interactions between the ULBs and other stake 
holders viz., the civil society agencies represented by NGOs and CBOs on a continuing 
and structured basis. Of course all this clearly means that the malaise has to be treated in 
a deep and fundamental way. Two most important points here have to do with the hiring 
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their role) and the way wage contracts are designed (they must importantly have an 
element of incentive compatibility) so as to instill a sense of responsibility and 
accountability. The later will instill accountability and create a stake for the workers. 
  The above will make it amply clear that there is a huge scope of capacity building 
(in many cases it would have to be termed capacity creation!). There is much discussion 
about this in the literature on governance but there seems to be a bias in favor of 
institutional level processes rather than human resource training which needs to be 
rectified. Thus, IT enablement (e-governance) or financial and audit processes 
(international standards) are talked about with scant regard or discussion about skill sets 
required and training there of for the persons who will ‘man’ these systems once they are 
in place. Also, there is very little discussion about process reengineering. It might be 
pertinent to note here that there are no process manuals available within the system that 
could be invaluable to the new recruits to work efficiently. This is an area where 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (management/ system experts) must synergistically come 
together and create workable manuals mapping the systems. Of course, it is well known 
that legacy systems need to be optimally changed so that the efficiency is truly enhanced. 
It is also common knowledge that ERP solutions fail, not because of hardware or 
technical software issues but because of non-acceptance by the agents ‘manning’ the 
agencies. Some sense of participation and stakeholding has to be created by working on 
the mindsets (always a difficult intangible thing to do!). True, these are not fancy things 
but we believe rather crucial if change is to come about successfully. 
  The situation is a result of non-existence of systemic features and structures (as 
reflected in practices, posts and processes). This has resulted in individuals holding 
general positions without knowing what is actually expected of them. It is no surprise that 
assessing their performance is a practice in ad-hocism. This obviously has meant that this 
has led to (among other things) arbitrary promotions with much heartburning. For 
example there are no posts for infrastructure/ socio-economic development/performance 
or Human resources planning personnel. For greater details and analysis refer to: 
Feedback Reach Report on HRD Policies & Strategies for ULBs, Commissioned by 
USAID.  
The actual capacities (based on our impression through casual empiricism) with 
the ULBs in MMR follow expected pattern with Municipal Corporations having the best 
capacities and going down with the size of the ULB. Amongst Corporations the 
capacities seem to depend on the particular Commissioner in charge (the systems are 
unfortunately not in place). In particular, NMMC shows much better work ethic 
compared to others followed by Thane and then Mumbai. Mumbai has the potential (in 
terms of skilled persons) which is greater than that seen from the level of actual delivery. 
Navi Mumbai and Thane are impressive because the employees up to reasonably lower 
levels seem to take pride in the initiatives they undertake. Mumbai on the other hand is 
peopled with disinterest and the lack of information coordination being blatant (of course 
the size is huge). Navi Mumbai seems much better managed but it could be explained by 
the fact that there are very few (historic) legacy systems to deal with or fall back upon. It 
had the fortune of clean slate having been handed over as a well planned turn key project 
by CIDCO.  
  28  Given the expanding need of personnel in ULBs with certain level and type of 
skill set, it is perhaps time to set up a board for conducting common test professionally. 
This will improve the quality and entry level caliber of prospective employees leading to 
a special cadre. A proper analysis has to be conducted to identify the needs based on 
tasks to be performed and suitable numbers of employees (section wise) have to be 
identified and recruited. This need to be mentioned especially because experience shows 
that expenditure management in government at all levels is often achieved by the easy 
route of sending disinterested persons on deputation and leaving the vacancies unfilled. 
  Properly vetted training (entry level and mid-course/refresher) programs have to 
be put in place and administered in a better way than is the current practice. Currently 
AIILSG and YASHADA are the only two institutes that can do this work. The general 
impression is that the ‘fits and starts’ approach wherein different courses and workshops 
are conducted is not very useful. Some of the courses make a routine appearance on 
yearly calendar and yet others cater to the ‘flavor of the season’. There is no rigorous 
evaluation of programs. There is lack of proper incentive mechanism for the participants 
with participatory enthusiasm being the casualty. All too often, the participants treat these 
as a paid holiday. On their part the institutes lack a well articulated long term mandate, 
sufficient human power as well as strong networking with other institutions,  (especially 
in case of YASHADA). It is common knowledge that such training institutes are looked 
upon as punishment transfers by the top echelons in the bureaucracy who then are unable 
to be inspiring! Thus, such places are treated as waiting rooms by the ambitious 
bureaucrats. Indeed we find the most active members often being the retired persons who 
in many cases continue to do stellar job! These observations are based on what one 
picked up through extended discussions with several stake holders and the purpose is not 
to be critical of persons (who by and large do seem to be diligent enough) but rather to 
make the point that one needs to signal seriousness through having efficient systems in 
place and through liberal resource backing (good things cost good money). 
 
VI. A Comparable Study 
  There is a clear dearth of studies that look at regions which has, amongst other 
things, to do with the mind sets of researchers and policy makers. The reason for such 
studies has to spring from the recognition that the effectiveness of cities and city regions 
performing as ‘engines of growth’ depend largely on the capacities of empowered 
municipal governments to mobilize local resources and provide at least basic 
infrastructure in order to ensure quality in service delivery. It is obvious that resource 
mobilization involves expanding the range of technical, administrative and financial 
alternatives. The presumption here is that such an activity by the local governments is 
supported by strengthening the power vested in them by higher level governments. 
  We did come across one study of close relevance Kulwant Singh, Behnam Ta’i 
and Shipra Mitra who tangentially look at the Delhi UA in a paper titled: ‘Financing 
Urban Infrastructure in India – A Case Study of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD)’. 
The paper is based on the premise that the rate of urbanization affects the revenue and 
expenditure structure of the concerned local bodies through the strengthening of the 
economic base on one hand and through the increase in demand for urban services. The 
objective of the paper is to find out whether some of the richest local bodies in the 
country have been able to internalize the gains from expanding urbanization through the 
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th CAA. It is recognized that high population 
density in cities generates externalities which need to be addressed through public 
regulation and involvement in service provision (such as transport, sanitation, health and 
other infrastructural facilities at increased levels). The paper correctly notes that the tax 
revenue of a local authority is determined by (a) the size of the economic base (b) the 
relationship between various tax bases and economic base (c) the statutory tax base for 
each relevant tax and (d) the collection efficiency. The paper also identifies that usual 
revenue raising instruments to be rationalization of user charges; local taxes and tax 
sharing (through inter governmental transfers). It makes the crucial point about the 
administrative capacities and political support as being the prerequisites for any 
successful resource mobilization program. The study – although conducted over six years 
ago – has findings that are painfully similar to our experience with MMR! 
  The area that one is talking about is around 1400 square km with a population 
density of around 6000 persons/sq.kms., in 1991. The strength of Delhi economy consists 
of large formal sector and even larger informal sector with the growth of the economy 
largely reflected in tertiary sector all of which is not unlike MMR. There are two master 
plans the sole authority of which vests with DDA (quite like MMRDA in case of MMR). 
The finances of the local bodies are normally strained and so generally it is the para-statal 
agencies that build up the capital infrastructure and hand over to the local bodies for 
maintenance. This means that capital investment shows up to very small extent in the 
local body budgets, this is again like in MMR case. The ULBs in the region show a large 
gap between the physical targets that were set as a part of the planning exercise and the 
actual achievements. This is true almost for every item, whether it is roads or sanitation 
or water or education or electricity. Thus, commensurate level of investment and capacity 
creation is called for to fill these gaps. 
  The internal resources and external resources are seen to be broken up in the 
proportion of 80:20 with the taxes around 50% of the revenues. In case of MMR the 
figures are more or less comparable.  The study notes that Delhi’s per capita income is 
over twice that of the national average and has shown further strong growth. This 
however has translated into ever increasing demand for quality services and civic 
amenities without the process contributing significantly to the kitty of the local bodies. 
This picture is similar (albeit to a varying extent) to the one we find in MMR. The 
experience of decentralization – post CAA – is universal, in that, the discretion and 
powers of the state government – to the detriment of the autonomy of ULBs – as 
exercised over the local bodies is overwhelming. Urban planning and town planning, 
listed under the schedule remain very much outside the jurisdiction of MCD (and other 
ULBs). Physical development with any perspective remains the sole responsibility of 
DDA with the involvement of ULBs is marginal in roads and slums. Indeed, even in 
MCD (the largest amongst the ULBs in the region) does not even have a separate 
Planning Department.  
  As far as the finances are concerned the ULBs in the region are very much 
dependent of the state government. The study points out that the allocation of funds does 
not follow any pattern or priority. This lack of adequacy as well as certainty is a problem 
generic to most states and ULBs including those in MMR. This leads to inability to 
service and maintain the various capital projects that are handed over by the 
Development Authorities. Over successive plans Delhi government has been reducing its 
  30plan outlays to MCD and other ULBs in the region and yet it is around 22-25% of the 
state plan outlay (probably because of the peculiar nature of Delhi) which is significantly 
higher than what is available to the ULBs in Maharashtra. The study reiterates that not 
only revenues but even revenue raising efforts by ULBs are heavily dependent on the 
state. The efforts on the part of the ULBs of course leave much to be desired but what we 
are referring to here has to do with the regulatory constraints and approvals required at 
every stage that limit the ability to charge. Apart from this, the distribution of grants does 
not necessarily match with the felt needs (largely the obligatory functions) of the ULBs 
but rather are determined by the convenience of the state priorities. This is not just a 
matter of coordination! 
  There is another important issue which has to do with the ULBs getting what is its 
rightful due. This again is a phenomenon generic to most regions including MMR. The 
governments and other semi-government agencies simply allow the arrears to accumulate 
(in some cases refuse to pay up in an outright manner leading to litigation!). For example 
the arrears of this type – in case of Delhi – amount more than half the revenue of the 
annual budget of the ULBs in the year 1998-99. The collection efficiency is another 
cause of concern which is common to MMR region. This is crucial because the rate of 
growth in property tax collections, even in MMR – as reported earlier – is lagging behind 
a ‘bad tax’ like the octroi (with the practical implication that there is no way that one can 
get rid of it). The study – about Delhi – observes that even a reasonable level of 
efficiency in collection of property tax will enable the ULBs in the region to raise 
additional resources to the tune of 40 to 50 thousand million Rupees for investment. This 
is indeed a huge opportunity cost. 
  In its rather dismal conclusion, the study notes that ‘the ULBs are not even 
capable of utilizing the existing instruments, let alone exploring new sources’. The 
regulatory and administrative inefficiencies are the cause. Thus, despite there being 
enough economic activity in the region, it is not being translated into revenue generation. 
The non-mandatory nature of 74
th CAA clause, dealing with State Finance Commission’s 
Award, does not help matters either. Development –by the ULBs – of innovative resource 




The big picture here is fairly clear. India finds herself at a crucial conjuncture 
wherein a sustained high growth strategy (which alone will allow her to accomplish 
proper development of her people) is within the realm of possibility. For this to happen, 
MMR has a very important role to play. Transformation of MMR clearly requires huge 
investment. It is also equally obvious that such an endeavor would require massive 
support at the Metropolitan (State) as well as the Central level. The incentive for such an 
investment comes from the fact that MMR is like the goose that lays golden eggs. The tax 
revenue enhancement from growth in MMR will be of a magnitude that will easily justify 
the levels of investment called for. The governments at these levels then need to be 
convinced of their enlightened self interest! 
The ULBs will be called upon to do a lot more if the growth trajectory is to be 
achieved. The extra services that will be called for will naturally lead to further hike in 
expenditure. Our analysis suggests that historically, revenues do not keep up with the 
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There is a need for rationalization of user charges /taxes as well as better collection 
efficiency on the part of ULBs if they have to deliver. The borrowing capacity will have 
to be put to good use through setting up of bankable projects and in conjunction with 
private players. Whilst in the realm of possibility, serious efforts at revenue enhancement 
as well as capacity building and incremental outsourcing will have to be the order of the 
day if service delivery (with reasonable quality) is to be ensured. 
Building castles in the air is sometimes a contentious point that lends itself to 
criticism. What we don’t realize is that the castles are where they should be. The point is 
to get down to the drawing board and build a strong foundational structure! 
 
***************** 
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